Implementing security into your design may seem somewhat daunting and time-/resource-intensive at first glance. You may be thinking that you don’t have the luxury for it. Fortunately, Atmel makes it easy when using the turnkey Atmel CryptoAuthentication IC.
At its most basic, the CryptoAuthetication device receives a challenge from a host system and a response is sent back to that host system. That challenge is combined with a secret key stored in the secure memory of the CryptoAuthetication using the MAC command. Then the result or response is sent back to the host system. If the response is correct as determined by the host system, then the operation can proceed.
How does that secret get into the CryptoAuthetication IC in the first place? Well, the CryptoAuthetication device requires that it be personalized or programmed with a known configuration for the application that it is intended to solve. Personalization of the device simply means configuring it to do what you want it to do.
The following methods can be used to place secure information into the CryptoAuthentication device:
You can program the IC using the available communications interfaces provided by the IC, namely SWI or TWI.
Atmel provides a software package and a hardware kit. This package is the Atmel CryptoAuthentication Evaluation Studio (ACES) and the AT88CK101STK8 or AT88CK109STK8 hardware.
Atmel has produced a Secure Personalization or Programmer Kit (combination hardware and software) that can be purchased to program the CryptoAuthentication in greater quantities than the ACES tool.
Atmel has approved several 3rd party programmers that can be purchased program the CryptoAuthentication before deployment.
Atmel has also approved several 3rd party companies that will program the CryptoAuthentication once the secrets have been securely received.
Atmel provides a service to their larger customers enabling the CryptoAuthentication to be personalized at final package test.
This service is for programming larger numbers of ICs where it is not conducive for you to manage it yourself.
Any of the 6 methods mentioned above will work for placing your specific data into the CryptoAuthentication device in order to protect your IP.
Who has not experienced a misbehaving computer due to a virus? Or, you may have at least seen your virus protection software catching one in the act. One especially nasty type of virus is one that is executed before the anti-virus (AV) software begins its process, because it can then manipulate your AV program in a way that it does not find the virus.
Two main programs are executed before your AV program: the binary input / output system (BIOS) and the operating system (OS). The central processing unit (CPU) executes these two programs as part of the “boot” process. Making this boot process secure can increase the overall security of a system in a big way. By verifying the authenticity of the code for the OS, a secure boot process prevents any virus from sneaking in and compromising a system before the AV program can take over system security.
To be able to verify the code, it is stored along with a “signature” of it at the time of manufacturing or code update. The signature is the output of a cryptographic hash function. (A hash function is irreversible and “condenses” a big blob of information such as boot code into a quite tiny size, 32 bytes for example.) Its inputs are the code and a secret key, known only to the generator of the signature and the verifying routine inside boot code (BIOS) that gets executed immediately after power-up or system restart. This verifying routine calculates the signature the same way it was calculated before by the host (system at manufacturing plant, online site for updating, etc.), and compares it with the stored signature. Only if the calculated and stored signatures match does the boot process continue. Otherwise, the boot verification routine halts the system.
The paragraph above describes a system where the verification (calculation and key storage) is done in the boot ROM. The picture below shows a system where the calculation and key storage are loaded off into a hardware device (ATSHA204) offered by Atmel. Storing the key in very secure, tamper-safe hardware adds a big obstacle to any hack attempt.
In today’s increasingly connected world, the need for security is no longer just for communicating over the Internet, but is also needed to ensure that the user’s personal computer is free from malicious code. In order to secure the user’s local computer, a root of trust needs to be established, starting from the manufacturer of the hardware and continuing through the firmware and into the installed software. The key components in securing this root of trust are a fixed or secured boot loader that is inherently trusted by the system and is used to start the authentication sequence, which can be implemented using many existing hardware security chips on the market, such as the ATSHA204 from Atmel. The second key piece needed is a secure key vault used to store the keys used to sign different pieces of code loaded on the system back to their developers. Once the code has been verified the boot ROM will start executing code and continue to repeat these steps until the system is fully booted. Once the root of trust has been established for the system, the user can ensure that none of the code running on the system has been modified.